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Controlling the expansion of capture capacity has been a major challenge for the 
fisheries management systems around the North Atlantic. Despite focused attempts to 
reduce this capacity in recent years in different jurisdictions, it has continued to 
expand. This chapter uses a case study of changes in Norwegian fisheries to help 
explain why this has happened. The article supports the replacement of the rational 
actor approach that is currently hegemonic within fisheries management by a 
relational approach to the analysis of capture capacity expansion.  A relational 
approach offers new insights into the ways political, economic, and technological 
forces continue to fuel capacity expansion within fishing. By use of this approach the 
article describes how the harvest machinery comes into existence.  
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1. Fishery policy, management, and technological change  
It is widely acknowledged that high fishing effort sustained over several decades was 
one of the causes behind the collapse in cod stocks in the north-east and north-west 
Atlantic in the 1980s and 1990s.  In Norway, for example, the collapse in the cod 
stock came in 1988/89 after a period of reduced profitability, huge subsidies to the 
sector, and technological modernisation that allowed the capture capacity in the 
fishing fleet to expand [1 and 2].  When the cod stock collapsed Norway, like other 
states in the north Atlantic, followed the dominant school of thought within resource 
management and abandoned open access fisheries regimes [3, 4, and 5]. Over the last 
decade all the fisheries directed at the important commercial fish stocks in 
Norwegian waters have been closed in an attempt to control capture capacity. 
Despite these closures and despite related reductions in the number of fishing vessels 
and people involved in fishing (Figure 1; Tables 1 and 2), capture capacity in both 
































Figure 1. Fishers in Norway 1983-2001. Source: [6] 
 
Table 1 shows the change in number of year-round operating fishing vessels in 
Norway1 between 1995 and 2000. These vessels account for more than 80% of catch 
                                                 
1 Hereafter named as year-round fishing vessels. 
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and value in the whitefish sector and 100 % of catch and value in the pelagic sector. 
While the number of smaller, year- round vessels decreased, the number of year- 
round vessels over 41 m increased in the period 1995-2000. Figures from the 
Fisheries Directorate show that the total gross tonnage in the fleet (both year-round 
and other vessels) has been maintained, while the total horsepower of the fishing 
fleet increased during the 1990s [12 and 13]. Other sources have documented how 
the oldest and least effective vessels in the Norwegian fishing fleet have been 
replaced by fewer, more powerful, and technologically more sophisticated fishing 
vessels [1 and 2]. This expansion in capture capacity is seen as the main obstacle to 
sustainable resource management, increased profitability in the fisheries, and to the 
legitimacy of the fisheries management system in Norway.  
 
Table 1. Change in numbers of whole year operating vessels 1995 and 2000. Source: 
[7-12] [15] 
Year and number of vessels Change in number 
of vessels  
Length 
groups  
1995 2000 1995-2000 
 8–12,9 m 1317 1179 -138 
13–20,9 m 753 577 -176 
21–30,9 m 180 190 10 
31–40,9 m 128 116 -12 
41 m og over 169 189 20 
Total 2547 2251 -296 
   
Table 2. Average man-labour years per vessel in different groups of whole year 
operating vessels in 1995 and 2000. Source: [7 –12] [15] 






8–12,9 m 1,2 1,2 0 
13–20,9 m 3,4 3,1 -9 % 
21–30,9 m 6,1 6,0 -1,6 % 
31–40,9 m 9,7 8,8 -9,3 % 
41 m og over  14,4 12,8 -11 % 




 Why then, has capture capacity continued to expand, despite a huge effort to 
reduce it?  This article tries to answer this question. The article is based on data and 
results from a doctoral project at Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University 
of Tromsø, undertaken in the period 1996-20022 [15]. The data sources are political 
and official documents, official statistics, research reports, articles, and qualitative 
interviews with fishers. Section 2 describes the ideas and models on which 
Norwegian fisheries policy is based. Section 3 charts the course towards an 
alternative framework for understanding the fisheries and designing policy. Section 4 
lays out the theoretical framework used in the analysis and introduces the empirical 
description of the changing practices and relations in fishing in section 5 and 6.  
Section 7 returns to the larger questions related to the relationships between fishing 
practice, policy and science and how these relationships contribute to capacity 
expansion and section 8 summarises the lessons learned.   
 
 
2. The ideas and models behind the recent fisheries policy and management  
Recent fisheries policy in Norway is heavily influenced by the ideas linked to the 
theory of the Tragedy of the Commons. Related to this, management is based on 
combination of biology and economics, bio economics.3 In the theory of the Tragedy 
of the Commons the individual and economic rational behaviour of people in open 
access regimes is regarded as the main cause of over-exploitation of resources and 
low profitability [3, 4 and 5]. Related recent fisheries policy and management build 
on the assumption that actors exploiting a common resource in a regime with open 
access and no regulations will always try to maximise their profit by expanding 
exploitation capacity. In the case of fisheries, this takes the form of capture capacity. 
The actors are defined as humans acting like pure micro-economic actors, or 
economic men. The cumulative product of their individually rational actions is a 
collective disaster, the Tragedy of the Commons, where resources are over-exploited 
[3 and 4]. In this view, the actors in the fisheries are people and the expanding 
capture capacity is viewed as a result of their individual and economic rational 
                                                 
2 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries through the Norwegian Research Council, the Norwegian 
College of Fishery Science, and the Centre for Rural Research, Trondheim, Norway financed the 
doctoral work. A grant from the program “Marked og Samfunn” (Market and Society) in the 
Norwegian Research Council made it possible to write this article on the basis of the material. 
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behaviour. This understanding has formed the basis for fisheries management in 
Norway and other countries in the North Atlantic [5, 15, and 16].4  
 The continuing growth of capture capacity in Norway and elsewhere, despite 
concerted steps to close off access to fisheries resources  suggests that the ideas and 
models on which management and policies are based, fail to accurately describe how 
actors in the fisheries are constituted and how action takes place [1, 2 and 15] Some 
researchers have suggested that the failure to control the expansion of capacity in the 
Norwegian fisheries through a reduction in the number of vessels and people, as 
prescribed by the authorities [5], indicates that the authorities’ understanding of the 
process of capacity expansion is poor. In other words, there is reason to ask whether 
the simplistic economic man approach that forms the basis of the current fisheries 
policy’s understanding of what “fishers” are and how they act, might be one of the 
reasons behind the expansion of capture capacity. Several fisheries researchers, who 
identify themselves with the co-management school of fisheries management, claim 
that this is the case. Representatives of the co-management school argue that the 
actors in fishing are not pure economic actors, but people embedded in social 
relations, norms and values [16 and 17]. This leads them to view individual action as 
a result of the relations, negotiations and co-operative actions between human beings 
in a society. The co-management school has made little progress in its attempt to 
establish an alternative to the dominant school in fisheries management [18].  
 The approach taken here does not support one or the other of these two 
schools. Instead, it is more in line with Standal [2], who argues that more integrated 
perspectives taking into account the dynamics of technology development, 
knowledge, policy, and economy are needed to understand the continued expansion 
of capture capacity. This third approach requires a relational approach to actors and 
actions in the fisheries.  
 
3. Towards a relational approach to actors and action in the fisheries 
Paradoxically, the ideas and models that have fuelled the enclosure of the Norwegian 
fisheries commons still make impact on interpretations of developments within those 
fisheries even after open access fisheries have ceased to exist. Thus, for example, a 
                                                                                                                                          
3 The combination of biological and economic models is the basis for the economic sub discipline, 
resource/bio economics, concerned with the management of renewable natural resources. 
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recent White Paper [5] describes Norwegian fishers as pure, economically rational 
actors. Its analysis and related policy solutions start with the assumption that these 
rational actors are fully responsible for the capture capacity expansion. Attributing 
excess capacity to the substantial properties of the individual fishers leads the authors 
of the White Paper to conclude that the solution to expanding excess capacity is to 
reduce, even further, the number of people involved in the fisheries [5 and 15]. In 
this substantialistic approach, where Economic Man is cause, explanation and 
outcome, responsibility and attention are removed from the management system and 
from policy makers, scientists and technology.   
 Official, political, and scientific analyses of capture capacity expansion in 
Norway take different variants of this powerful, substantialistic understanding of the 
actors and the results of their actions for granted. Even analyses of the current 
situation that are critical of this hegemonic perspective tend to be attracted to the 
ideas and the rhetoric of the theory of the Tragedy of the Commons. Thus Standal 
and Aarseth [1], for example, attribute the continued increase in harvesting capacity 
to what they call the Tragedy of “Soft Choices”. By this they mean the small 
adjustments and adaptations the individual actors make every day [1]. Despite being 
critical of attempts to use the Tragedy of the Commons as the basis for fisheries 
management, their own understanding of the actors ends up being very similar to that 
of Hardin and his followers.  
Studies of the dynamic relationship between political, economic, and 
technological factors as crucial elements in the expansion of capture capacity [2] 
require relational approaches to actors and to the processes in the fisheries. These 
approaches imply that neither expanding capture capacity nor other outcomes of 
processes are driven forward by substantial properties of individual actors. Instead 
capacity expansion and other outcomes are treated as consequences of processes of 
changing relations and networks. Relational perspectives are prominent in works of 
often- cited theorists like Bourdieu [19] and Latour [20], but the potential of 
relational approaches has not been fully utilised in studies of the fisheries and fishery 
policy. While the co-management school regards actors as social constituted and is 
thus influenced by this perspective, co-management theorists also tend to believe that 
                                                                                                                                          
4 For instance in Canada; the fisheries management system is based on the same ideology as in 
Norway [16]. 
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human beings have certain substantial properties and also believe in of the existence 
of certain kinds of social systems, like local communities [16 and 17].  
A more radical relational approach that rejects substantialism, as does Latour 
[20], has not been much used in fisheries research. This article draws on the few 
exceptions [15, 18, and 21] that exist. These works abandon the substantialistic 
understanding of human fishers as the core actors in the fisheries. Instead they regard 
fishers as heterogeneous networks of relations.    
 
4. The fisher as a heterogeneous network of relations  
From a relational point of view, the world consists of relations and networks [19 and 
20]. Consequently, neither the actors in the fisheries, e.g. the fishers, nor the fishing 
sector, nor the resources themselves can be understood as fixed entities in 
themselves; instead, their properties or substances are products of the relations 
between them [15 and 18]. All the elements in relations can be viewed as the 
outcome of relations between heterogeneous actors [20]. To say that the actors are 
heterogeneous means that they consist of relations that are not purely social and that 
the world of relations never ends. This is the starting point for Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT), which forms the theoretical basis for this article. ANT, like other 
system theories, moves the focus away from the properties of inviduals; placing 
emphasis instead on the relational aspects of the many different practices we perform 
[20 and 22]. ANT studies never start with a fixed understanding of an actor’s 
properties, but study instead how actors are constituted in networks of relations [22]. 
In ANT the fisher as an actor must be seen as something that is continuously 
produced through certain processes and relationships. From this perspective, the 
fisher’s essence, rationality, actions, abilities and possibilities will change under 
changing circumstances. Thus, what we regard as the fisher depends on the whole 
network of relations that participate in creating the fisher including rhetoric, science, 
politics, technology, fish, weather, shore, bottom, currents, gear, and fishing 
performance. Hence, a distinction can be made between the individuals in the 
fisheries and the fishers as actors. In ANT, individuals can be performers, but the 
actors, actions, and the products forming action are regarded as outcomes of a whole 
complex of players, processes and events, rather than representing the individual 
properties of the performers [22 and 23].  Thus, an individual fishing with a handline 
is related to the fisheries in a different way from an individual on board a purse 
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seiner, although these individuals can have the same properties as human beings. 
Neither the actors nor the actions are the same in these two settings.  
 ANT is also opposed to the assumption that actors are determined by 
structural elements. Actors come into existence by making relations, by using 
different tools and strategies, but they do not come into existence by people entering 
an open space in an existing structure [20]. Instead, they come into existence through 
the continuous production of relations; a production process that human individuals 
also participate in.  Thus, ANT does not assume that the individuals alone can be 
defined as the actors, because they are not able to define their space and possibilities 
for action only by themselves, without relations. Nor does ANT regard the actors as 
defined by or embedded in a structure, because the relations that create the actors do 
not exist a priori, but come into existence through the action that takes place. Indeed, 
the shape and the boundaries of the actors can be vague. ANT-based studies aim 
therefore not at complete descriptions of actors, but towards descriptions of action. 
ANT provides a methodology for identifying the processes that create and form the 
actors, the space and action. The individuals are seen as participants in processes 
where they are defining other elements’ identities, action, and space, but where they 
also are defined, forced to act, acted upon and put in position by the rest of the 
network [22 and 23]. In ANT it is not an airplane or a person that flies, it is an airline 
or an institution like the Air Force that flies. And this institution is not only an 
organisation or structure, but also a collective of humans, material things, and natural 
laws represented by science, regulations, signs and symbols related to each other [20 
and 22].  
 From the perspective of ANT, the fishery is not conducted by individuals, but 
by fishing enterprises of different sizes, shapes, and characters. The fishing actors are 
the enterprises, with all their relations, persons, technologies, regulations, etc. Thus 
to understand how change occurs in the fisheries, we have to study how the relations 
that make up these enterprises are changing, and how they link together. The 
individuals can be allowed to speak on behalf of the enterprise, and on behalf of 
those who are given the legal right and the political status as “fishers,” but these 
representatives must not be confused with the real actors, which consist both of the 
human individuals and of all the relations that allow them to hold this prominent 
position.  
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 ANT describes how the many bits, pieces, and relations that actors and 
enterprises consist of are woven together in strong networks so that an actor or a 
group of actors become the central point through which all rhetorical, material and 
practical processes must pass [24].  
 
This, then, is the core of the actor-network approach: a concern with how actors and 
organizations mobilize, juxtapose, and hold together the bits and pieces out of which 
they are composed; how they are sometimes able to prevent those bits and pieces 
from following their own inclinations and making off; and how they manage, as a 
result, to conceal for a time the process of translation itself and so turn a network 
from a heterogeneous set of bits and pieces each with its own inclinations, into 
something that passes as a punctualized actor.  
 
The “fisher” as an actor consists of many bit and pieces [25] and must be considered 
as such a heterogeneous network of human action, politics, laws and regulations, 
technology, science, social relations, and economic responsibilities, folded out in 
time and space, but also punctualized in the human beings who represent and speak 
for the rest of the complex [15]. And as my empirical description from the cod 
fisheries in the next two sections shows, new relations are continuously introduced, 
enrolled in the network and mobilised to participate in the constitution and change of 
the actors and the practices in the fisheries. From the point of view of ANT, it is 
through the description of how theses processes go on, that we see the relationship 
between actors, actions, and capture capacity expansion.   
 
5. Cod gill netting in the 1980s – a loose but localised network  
In the 1980s there were wide variations in the Norwegian coastal fishing fleet. The 
fleet consisted of vessels of many different types and ages (figure 2). The gill net 
fishery for cod was important for many vessels and a typical coastal gillnet vessel 
could be between 50 and 65 feet long, built of wood, with the superstructure almost 
at the stern. The deck machinery was simple and flexible, with a hydraulic gurdy and 
often, also, a winch on the foredeck, where most of the work was carried out. Both 
the winch and the gurdy could be used for many purposes. To switch between 
different fisheries usually meant a change of gear, and did not require much change 
in the deck machinery. The vessels had an echo sounder, radar and Decca or Loran C 
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for navigation, autopilot, and several radio transmitters. The wheelhouse equipment 
was not interfaced or linked electronically; a skilled skipper was needed to operate 
them. The skipper switched on every individual item when the need became evident.  
 
 









Traditionally, boats of this type had from 2-5 owners, who often also worked 
on board; in Norway this is called partner ownership. As recently as the early 1980s, 
many of the crews were relatives or neighbours. The crews consisted of 4 to 6 
persons who handled 150 to 200 nets. Around 1980 most of the gill nets in the cod 
fishery were still made of nylon twines; a great improvement on the former cotton 
twine nets. During the 1970s the twine became thinner and thinner, and more 
difficult to mend. The nets were usually rigged with plastic rings as floats and iron 
rings as sinkers. Floats and sinkers were attached to the headline and footline with a 
short band. The nets were linked together in fleets of about 30 nets. In the early 
1980s the fishers could choose between 4 or 5 types of cod gillnets with different 
mesh sizes, twine and depths.  
Nets that were damaged during fishing were taken out of the string and either 
repaired on board by the fishers or repaired after the season. Before every season the 
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nets were thoroughly mended and repaired, and usually a net lasted for several 
seasons. The nets made of the thinnest twine (steel nylon) were usually damaged 
beyond repair and the netting had to be totally replaced. The repair was traditionally 
undertaken by the fishers themselves, family members, and by hired, retired fishers 
from the community [15].5 The amount of work after a season could be formidable. 
The family based crew that partly owned the gear, the need for local labour for 
maintenance, and the partnership that was necessary to raise the capital for 
investment, linked the vessel to the communities where the owners, the crew and the 
hired labour lived. Through family and community relationships, the fishery and the 
fishery enterprises were an integrated part of life in many families and communities. 
In the early 1980s a seasonal labour force was still available [26, 27, and 28]. 
All variable costs, like oil, ice, food and sounder paper, were deducted from 
the value of the catch and the remaining or net catch value was divided into three 
parts, one part to the boat, one to the gear and one to the crew, the skipper included. 
Usually the crew got 60% of the net catch value, and the share was paid out after the 
season.6 Often some of the crewmembers owned nets, which gave them part of a 
share in the gear. The gear was a part of the real capital in fishing, and in this way the 
capital was shared between several persons, likewise the income and the risks.  
 When setting out the gear the skipper was in the wheelhouse, steering, using 
the navigation and fish finding equipment, but also looking for landmarks if possible. 
Positions, landmarks, and the profile of the sea bottom at the fishing grounds were 
recorded in the skipper’s head, and in written records. Before navigation instruments 
became available, navigation was a challenge, especially in the winter with snow and 
little daylight. Equipment like Decca and Loran C made it much easier to navigate in 
the early 1980s than earlier, but still everything had to be done manually, and the 
skipper was tied to the wheelhouse. After the skipper had ordered: “let go” under 
setting and the first grapnel was thrown, everything on the deck depended on the 
deck hands. Two men watched the gill nets running over the stern and the rest of the 
deck hands threw out grapnels, stakes, buoys, and warps.  
                                                 
5 This account is based on personal experience as a gill net fisher in the 1980s, a documentary film, 
“Kystfeskar” from 1984, telephone interview with a fishing vessel producer, material collected at the 
Norfishing exhibition, relevant literature, and interviews with the fishers Jacob, Roy and Peter. In 
addition I have also obtained technical information from a gillnet producer.  
6 The share system is regulated through agreements between crew and vessel owners within the 
Norwegian Fishermen’s Association.  
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The skipper remained in the wheelhouse during hauling. Most of the work on 
deck was manual. One man was hauling the nets over the roller on the foredeck with 
the gurdy. From the gurdy two men manually hauled the nets on a gutter to the 
setting position at the stern. One to three men worked along the gutter taking the fish 
out of the nets, before they were hauled back. The two men at the stern, one on each 
side of the boat, cleared and untangled the nets, and split the headline with the floats 
from the footline with the sinkers, by pulling the footline to one side of the stern and 
the headline to the other. The floats and the sinkers on each fleet of nets were neatly 
piled side by side on each side of the stern, with new fleets being placed on top of 
each other until all fleets were on board. A float or a sinker in the wrong position 
meant the string would tangle when the gear was being set. The same could happen if 
trash was left in the net. The soft thin nylon threads tangled easily if the fishers did 
not clean the threads. However, the clearing was the fastest operation and the two 
men responsible for this work helped the crew on the foredeck if necessary. The 
work was organised in a cycle, and the crew shifted positions from fleet to fleet, in 
order to vary the work. With enough crew, one man usually also worked gutting the 
fish. With moderate amounts of fish, that allowed the hauling and clearing to go on 
without stopping, 5-6 men took about one hour to haul a fleet of 30 nets.  
Most of the boats were manned for a good fishery. The manpower “slack” 
that could occur if the fishery was poor could be used to increase the value of the 
catch by splitting and salting fish on board. If the crew was too small, the efficiency 
dropped, even with a moderate catch, because fewer nets could be handled. Fishing 
also became more difficult, risky and weather dependent with a small crew.  
There were informal procedures for how the work should be done, with room 
for individual adaptations. Individual preferences for work positions, different 
abilities, speeds and rhythms for the work, and differing personalities working 
together had practical relevance. To be a recruit could be both difficult and confusing 
due to conflicting instructions from the other crewmembers.  
The gill net fishery in the early 1980s was a manual, labour intensive fishery, 
dominated by local relations through crewmembers, ownership, capital and hired 
labour. All the human, technical, scientific, and political bits and pieces which made 
up the enterprises and actors in this fishery, were neither woven tightly together, nor 
particularly standardised or specialised [15]. To be a skipper and a vessel owner 
required an ability not only to find fish and to lead the work at sea, but also to 
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coordinate several processes of employment, maintenance, training, and 
management. In this informal universe, the space for variation was huge and many of 
the processes relied on local input of manpower and knowledge, more than on 
standardised procedures and systems.  
To be successful, skippers in the coastal fishing fleet in the 1980s required a 
presence in or close connection to fishing communities, which were the only arenas 
for all these processes. In these arenas the fishing enterprises produced fish, money, 
labour, activity, sociality, status, and power. The outcomes were multiple and many; 
many informal pay -offs existed. During the 1990s this changed radically. 
 
6. From loosely coupled bits and pieces to integrated harvest machinery 
Twenty years later, around 2000, a typical gill net vessel is between 30-45 feet, with 











Figure 3: A modern Norwegian capture machine, 43 feet long, with about 150 
monofilament nets and hydraulic equipment for net handling. Operated by two to 










During the 1990s the “sjarks” have become more standardised and specialised both 
in size and in terms of their equipment [15]7. Rarely more than three men operate 
these boats, which are usually drifting with between 50 and 300 nets. For navigation 
they use radar, GPS, digital chart machines, and autopilot. These last three elements 
are interfaced and by a click on the mouse in the wheelhouse the vessel steers to the 
position that the skipper has saved in the computer. All the equipment, except 
sometimes the radar, is switched on from one main switch in the wheelhouse. As 
“Jacob” said: it was only the danger of collision with other vessels that made it 
necessary to be on watch, and the navigation is much faster than when they had to 
use charts in combination with Decca or Loran C. The new colour echo sounders also 
make it easier to find the fish. With a short introduction almost everybody is now 
able to navigate, even if some experience is still needed to find the fish. 
The deck machinery is more specialised than on the old gill-netters and the 
gear has also changed. Both the hauling and the clearing are mechanised, and the 
gear is adapted to mechanised handling. Different types of hydraulic gillnet haulers 
have replaced the man who held the nets in the gurdy. The nets still run through a 
gutter to the stern and skipper and the other crew cooperate in taking out the fish and 
gutting it. 
 The nets are made of monofilament with floating line for headline and lead 
line as ground line. Monofilament nets are more invisible in the water than 
multifilament nets and fish better in daylight and in shallow water than the 
multifilament nets. The mesh size and depth have not necessarily changed, but a 
wide variety of nets is available; today more than 20 types of cod nets are available. 
The floats and the sinkers are an integrated part of the gill net and do not have to be 
piled neatly on each side. Since the monofilament thread does not entangle like the 
soft nylon threads, clearing is an easy operation. The nets are hauled to the setting 
position very fast. There is no need to separate the headline and the leadline and 
spread the nets out over the whole stern. Without separate floats and sinkers, less 
space is needed and the nets are hauled into bins at the stern by a hydraulic device 
(garngreier) (figure 3). According to Roy and Jacob, mechanisation has reduced the 
physical workload and standardised and increased the speed of operations.  
                                                 
7 In the 1980s various producers and types of boats dominated. Today, fewer producers and boat types 
are dominating the market.  
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The nets are not repaired in the “old way”. When the season is over, the 
damaged nets are cut loose from the main lines. The lines are brought to the net 
manufacturer where new nets are mounted. Some manufacturers can also store the 
nets for the boat between the seasons. The mechanisation, as well as these new 
practices, link the gear and the boat closer together and also reduce the interest of 
crewmembers in owning their own nets. The gear is no longer an investment that will 
last or something that can be repaired by the owner alone and a minimum of 
organisation is required. Gill nets can be regarded more as a production factor than a 
part of the real capital, although the tariffs and agreements about sharing the catch 
still treat them as a part of the real capital. Hence the knowledge of making and 
repairing nets has vanished among the people involved in fishing as more and more 
of the manual skills that were required in the 1980s are replaced by other types of 
knowledge that are more relevant for today’s fishing enterprises. These include the 
ability to run a complex business, control finances and investments and understand 
the fishing regulations [15].   
The knowledge about nets is still important for fishing, but has been 
translated into the manufacturing system. Since fishing operations have become more 
dependent on the knowledge and service provided by manufacturers, the fishery and 
industrial manufacturing system have become more closely linked, not least through 
the formal economic transactions that take place. Actually, the gear manufacturer has 
become a part of the relations that constitute the fishing enterprise. The relationship 
between them represents a sharing of the work in the enterprise. A professional 
system for gear making and maintenance takes care of the land-based activities. The 
sharing of work allows those operating on the sea to devote themselves to the capture 
activities. Since the equipment can handle a wide variety of nets, they can change to 
fishing other species like tusk, ling and Greenland halibut when the quota-regulated 
fisheries are over. But instead of changing gear, for instance to longline as many did 
before, it is now possible to continue and specialise in gill net fishing, like the fishing 
enterprises that Jacob and Roy are involved in have done. Professional systems now 
take care of more and more of the activities that the skipper and the crew undertook 
during or between fishing seasons.  
The fishing boat is the point at which all these systems meet, and even if the 
owner and the skipper become their representative, it is obvious that the enterprise is 
not only a boat and the crew members, but a mix of many professional systems that 
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all aim to contribute to maximal or optimal efficiency in the parts of the operations 
they are responsible for. One result of these changes is the reduced need for 
manpower. Two to three men operate these vessels, but Roy and Jacob can, if 
necessary, operate without other crewmembers. A steering position at starboard 
reeling, behind the hauling equipment, is standard on all vessels, so the skipper can 
control both the vessel and the hauling from one position. As Roy said, 
mechanisation has made it possible for three men to tend the same number of gillnets 
on a 42 footer as 6 men could handle in the same period of time on his former 64 
footer. Jacob usually fishes with one and sometimes two crewmembers in the winter 
and without crew during the summer. He prefers to have less responsibility for other 
peoples’ lives and income. It is not unusual for two boats to “buddy up” and operate 
together, sometimes with the same crew and with the same nets, but sharing the 
work, the costs and the catch between the vessels until both the vessels have caught 
the quota. Sometimes two skippers also buddy up and work as crewmembers for 
each other. Through this “skipper fishery” they reduce labour costs, specialise, and 
move towards more labour efficient practice.  
People’s work on board has also changed. The gear is handled through 
technical devices that require standardised operation. All these devices are part of the 
enterprise and link it to the different networks from which the devices originate. 
Through these networks also flow a continuous flood of new ideas, technologies, 
practices, and possibilities for action. The human relations directly involved on board 
are reduced, and local links are replaced by the more global links which the 
technology represents, weakening the coupling of the enterprises and actors in 
fishing to the local environment.  Simultaneously, they become more tightly 
integrated into a strong fisheries network, which runs through fishing enterprises 
linking them at the local, regional and global levels. In this respect the fisheries are 
becoming more and more integrated into modern society.  
This replacement of people by machines and institutions has changed all 
relations in the Norwegian fishery. Fishing practices have been turned into an 
assembly line type of production, and have become part of a larger national and 
international fisheries harvesting system based on the same ideologies as the 
production and manufacturing of other industrial products, and on science and 
rationality. Through involvement in this assembly line of production and the 
ideology of industrialisation, the designers and the producers of the vessels’ 
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equipment become more prominent in the relations in fishing. One outcome is that a 
larger amount of gear can be handled more effectively, with fewer people. A second 
outcome is that the relationship between fishing enterprises and their communities 
has changed.  
Now, what does all of this have to do with the persistent problem of excess 
capture capacity in Norway’s fishery? Budsjettnemda8 has documented the reduction 
in manpower that has taken place in recent years in Norway’s fishery (table 2). 
Between 1995 - when the Budsjettnemda [7 –12] made the first estimates of the work 
effort in man-labour years  and 2000, all groups of fishing vessels in the Norwegian 
year-round fishing fleet, except the smallest, have experienced a reduction in average 
man-labour years per vessel.9 For all groups of vessels over 13 m the average 
reduction in man-labour years per vessel has been 7.5%. The actual amount of work, 
in respect of hours behind each man-labour year and the number of working hours 
per man, varies between the different types of fisheries and from year to year due to 
factors like quotas, regulations, market situation, weather, resource availability, 
technological innovations and renewals in the fleet. However, the decline in man-
labour years and in the number of fishers in the period 1995-2000 has neither 
resulted in reduced capture capacity, nor harder work for the remaining fishers. In 
fact, fewer vessels and registered fishers landed a higher catch and value in 2001 
than in 1995, with fewer days at sea, and with a lower number of working hours and 
man-labour years [7-12]. In part, this development is the result of fish availability, 
quotas, and fish prices, but it is also a direct result of a higher level of mechanisation 
and more efficient operations. 
 The difference between the 1980s and today is that all the relations have 
changed. There are fewer people involved, fewer local links, and, as we shall see 
below, an increased amount of external capital has been invested in Norway’s 
fisheries. Our description of the sjark, for example, where men undertake more and 
more standardised operations with machines makes it reasonable to talk about the 
gear, vessel and the crew as a more coherent and integrated system today than earlier 
[15]. Several sources document that this is the case in all Norwegian fisheries [1 and 
2].   
                                                 
8 Budsjettnemda is a committee with members from both the authorities and business, and evaluates 
the economic situation in the Norwegian fishing fleet every year.  
9 Man\year expresses the average use of manpower on board a fishing vessel.  
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Today’s fishing technology can be characterised as integrated harvest 
machinery within which people are not placed outside the machinery as users and 
masters, but must instead be seen as an integrated part of the machinery. Like 
workers on an assembly line, people’s performances in fishing are shaped by the 
production system, which in this case is the harvest machinery, and a dense network 
of social and institutional relationships. As performers, people have become more 
closely linked to and more dependent on the machines and the technological, 
scientific, and economic networks of which they are a part. The role of technology 
within fishing is not neutral. Just as much as the people involved in fishing, 
technology helps shape fishing performance, represents the technological networks 
that produce it, and conveys ideas, values, goals and interests. However, the people’s 
experiences are also important. The exchange of experiences and the individual 
success or fiascos of those who have the formal status of “fisher” are continuously 
fed back into the technological network, where they play a role in the continuous 
development and adaptation of technology. The flow and exchange of ideas, 
experience, knowledge, and possibilities create a dynamic and changing fisheries 
sector. In short, the new, strong relationships and the exchange of experience and 
knowledge have made the technology more efficient and contributed to the 
expansion of capture capacity within Norway’s fisheries.  
Standardisation has reduced the need and opportunity for variation in 
practical work and when the machinery requires certain operational procedures, 
which in many cases are much easier to learn than the old practices, the former 
practices and the knowledge linked to them vanish [15]. As a result, fishing cannot 
happen without the machinery on which fishing has become more dependent. 
Whereas earlier we could talk about human fishers with individual fishing 
knowledge, more and more of the knowledge is now embedded in machinery and the 
institutions, rather than in the individual. Fishing knowledge has been transformed 
from personal to institutional knowledge, making it possible to systematise it and 
strengthen some elements while weakening others. Personal beliefs, values, and 
ethics can, for instance, be filtered out, and the knowledge can be purified and 
directed towards specific goals, like more efficient fishing or more responsible 
fishing.  
Although personal knowledge and experience are still important for a 
successful skipper, today, most of the services and inputs can be purchased from 
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professional services, which are no longer necessarily locally available. The skipper 
no longer has to be localised in, or have relationships with a local community, in 
order to gain access to essential processes and inputs for the enterprise. It is still 
necessary, however, to coordinate and hold the bits and pieces together, but in 
another way, by other means, and involving different allies and arenas than before. 
This brings us to policy, science, and economy and the way that they participate in 
the creation of actors, action and capacity expansion. 
 
7. How policy, science, and economy participate in creating actors and actions 
From the mid 1930s to the beginning of the 1990s a cooperative model, where 
cooperative institutions controlled by the fishers held considerable power and 
influence, played a central role in the institutional framework of Norwegian fisheries. 
In particular a close formal cooperation between the Norwegian Fishermen’s 
Association (NFA) and the authorities existed [29, 30, and 31]. This legal and 
institutional framework gave the fishers, as an organised professional group, 
formidable power, with exclusive legal rights to set prices for fish and to control  
sales of their fish through mandated sales organisations (MSOs) [29 and 32]. From 
1964, NFA had the exclusive right to negotiate subsidies to the fisheries through the 
Main Agreement between NFA and the Ministry of Fisheries [33, 34, 35, and 36]. 
The cooperative framework and the power it gave to NFA and the MSOs were, 
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, regarded by fisheries economists as contributing 
to the profitability problems in the sector starting in the late 1950s [34, 37, and 38]. 
Legal protection and the view that these cooperative institutions were protectors of 
fishing communities made it difficult to change strong institutions like NFA and the 
MSOs. A totally new situation in the cod fisheries was needed before the strong 
legal, political, and social network of the cooperative model could be weakened 
enough for changes to be made.    
The collapse of the Norwegian Northern cod stock and the sudden halt that 
occurred in the fishery in 1988/89 was partly unexpected. The new situation required 
force majeure, and the fisheries authorities had to act quickly. In 1989, open access 
was abandoned. With this move an important part of the foundation for the 
cooperative model was taken away, because the cooperative’s members were now 
given different statuses in law based on those with and without rights to the 
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resources. This inequality caused a lot of turbulence in the cooperative institutions in 
the following decade. 
 Fisheries economists argued in the 1980s that the cooperative model 
contributed to an excessively high fishing effort and to a situation in Norwegian 
fisheries similar to the Tragedy of the Commons [37, 38, and 39]. With the collapse 
of the cod stock, the cooperative model and all its institutions were put under 
pressure [40].  NFA was weakened both through the internal tensions in the 
organisation that followed because of the reduced importance of the Main 
Agreement, and because of the turbulence caused by the closure of the fisheries. 
With a weaker NFA, the power in the Norwegian fisheries management system could 
be centralised as prescribed in the theory of the Tragedy of the Commons [15, 18, 
and 31]. The authorities were able, during the first half of the 1990s, to take full 
control of the situation and a new model for the fisheries replaced the cooperative 
model in Norwegian fisheries.  
The ideas and solutions that underlay this new resource management model 
had developed after the collapse of the herring fishery in the 1960s, through what 
Holm [32] calls a silent revolution. This resource management model’s scientific 
basis combines Beverton and Holt’s population dynamic model from biology with 
the micro economic models for economic behaviour [4]. Hence, the resource 
management model is strongly related to the same understanding of the actor as the 
theory of Tragedy of the Commons [4 and 15]. The contribution of bio economics is 
that both nature and society can be treated inside the same models [18 and 41] and 
economic solutions to the problems caused by open access can be launched.  
In bio economics, limited access to and sole ownership of resources are seen 
as the most efficient ways to achieve sustainable use of a resource, secure 
profitability, and to cope with excess capacity. Private owners are regarded as more 
protective of their property than users in an open access fishery [4 and 16]. The 
resource management model reflects these underlying assumptions; its universal 
solution to problems in the fisheries is to introduce quotas. Licences and quotas had 
already been introduced in the trawler fleet and in the pelagic sector in Norway [42], 
and since their introduction, these Norwegian fisheries have become much more 
concentrated, closed, professionalized, and industrialised than the more open access, 
coastal water fisheries [43, 44 and 45]. When this resource management model was 
established as the basis for fishery policy in Norway, the authorities argued that a 
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system based on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) was the preferred long term 
goal. That idea was turned down by NFA and the Parliament at the start of the 1990s 
in favour of a system based on individual, non-transferable vessel quotas [40]. 
However, in practice, indirect sale of quotas occurs [42] and, as in other countries 
with resource management based on quota systems, the move from open access to 
closed fisheries has led to a concentration of rights and quotas [16].  
The introduction of quotas has had other effects as well. Quotas are not a 
neutral tool, they link together in new ways, the resources, the vessels, the owners, 
the politicians, the bureaucrats, the scientists, and many other agents including the 
banks that finance the buying and selling of quotas, and the producers of fishing 
technologies.  Thus we see that a fishing enterprise does not consist of a vessel 
manned by individuals with the same interests and inherent approach to fishing. 
Instead, it consists of a complex web of relations extending beyond the boundaries of 
the vessels and the fishers to local, regional, national and international organizations, 
as well as into the sea to fluctuating and changing marine ecosystems. We also see 
that changes in the resource base, in technologies, ideas and policy change have 
changed that web of relations with consequences for current and future fisheries 
trends.    
A successful fisheries enterprise consists not only of the owner, the crew, the 
vessel, the fish and the quotas available, but is also woven into the network of 
regulations that define its relations to the fish, negotiations with other states, the 
production, interpretation and application of science, and the development of gear 
and vessel technology.  In the current context, the enterprise must be able to enter 
into transactions related to buying and selling rights and quotas, undertake planning, 
obtain finance and credit, and evaluate risks. The change from open access to a 
closed system has promoted a process that turns fishing enterprises into more 
professionalized, businesslike relationships. Fishing is becoming a professionalized 
business and trade like other professions, businesses and trades in modern society.  
The process of enclosure and professionalization is changing the relationship 
of the crews, coastal communities and general public to marine resources. Thus, 
fewer people from the communities have direct or indirect access to the fish [7, 15 
and 42]. Rights and responsibilities are being transferred from the public to the 
private sector. The ordinary crew, who no longer has any legal rights to the fish 
resources, their families, and their communities, now depend more on representatives 
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of the capture network for their access to the fish resources and the wealth they 
generate. These changes are not only a result of fisheries related changes but also of 
other changes in Norwegian society and coastal communities [15]. 
The resource management model described above has contributed to the shift 
from labour intensive, locally based and loosely coupled fishing operations to 
operations based on integrated harvest machinery. The fish that, before, were no 
one’s property in law, have now become the quasi-private property of some actors.  
Nature, represented by the fish, is now partially woven into the fishing enterprise. 
Based on vessel length and other criteria, the resource model gives fishers a certain 
volume of fish or other marine resource to act upon. In so doing it has made 
exclusive rights and quotas to fish the basis for profitability and sustainability within 
the industry. A boat is no longer only a boat, but now represents an option on a 
certain amount of fish. Although the exact quota and price vary from year to year, 
likely income levels can be estimated. The possibility of a good year is replaced by 
the guarantee of a more secure, but limited income.  
By virtue of this process of rolling Nature into the fishing enterprise, the 
longer term political goals of increased stability and reduced income variation within 
the industry have, at least temporarily, come closer to reality.  However, as pointed 
out by Standal and Aarseth [1], the policy has also favoured lengthening fishing 
vessels, making it a promoter of technological modernisation and a driver of 
expanding capture capacity, despite the political goal to reduce such capacity. This 
process is reflected in the change in patterns of investment during the rather short 
period between 1995 and 2001. Table 3 shows that more than 7 billion Norwegian 
kroner have been invested in the fishing fleet over 13 m since 1995. The long-term 
liabilities of this fleet have increased by 168% during the period 1995-2001, which is 
many times higher than the rate of inflation and reflects an increase in technical 
standards on the vessels. Related to these changes, capital costs have increased while 
the wage paying ability of enterprises has declined (table 3), according to the figures 
from Budsjettnemda [7- 12]. Even if fewer people and fewer boats are directly 
involved in fishing, the remaining boats and people have had to achieve a higher 
catch value in 2001 than in 1995 in order to pay for the increased costs of 
investment.10   
                                                 
10 The declining interest level will improve this situation in short term.  
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Traditionally, not even the biggest vessel owners expected yield from the 
invested equity in the Norwegian fishing fleet [46 and 47]. Ownership in the fishing 
fleet was characterised by patience in respect of yield from invested capital, not least 
because much of the capital was local and because of the many different social 
benefits derived from the fishing enterprises.  Professional capital owners, like banks 
and other financial institutions, government investment bodies, and private investors, 
behave quite differently from traditional owners in the fishing fleet in this respect 
[15, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50]. Both fishing vessel owners and people selling 
accountancy services to fishing vessels report a change in this area. Fishing is now 
regarded as a purely commercial activity, and the professional capital owners require 
higher profit in the short term than owners in the fishing sector traditionally have 
expected. [15]. As a consequence, even those who have traditionally been patient 
have to adapt to the more impatient market economics [49, 50, and 51].  
Many fishing vessels today, even small ones, are organised as corporations 
and no longer as partnerships [47]. The ideology, the forms of organisation, the 
institutional framework, the rules for taxes, yield, etc. and the financial situation in 
the fishing fleet are therefore much closer to the patterns we find in land based 
businesses. When, for example, rights and quotas become elements in transactions, 
they can also be regarded as a part of the equity in the fisheries [47].  In this way the 
institutions financing vessels gain more control over fishing activities and strengthen 
their links with the fishery resources [48, 49, and 50]. Capital seeks investment 
opportunities, but with a smaller number of vessels and individuals with access 
rights, the positions to invest in are becoming scarcer in the fisheries. Fewer fish, 
quotas, and people can increase the price for entering into relationships. If the 
scarcity of fish and quotas increase the price of fish and quotas, and the related costs 
of fishing, and more intensive resource exploitation becomes necessary to meet the 
increased costs – then the ecological benefits of limiting access to the fisheries may 
disappear.  
The fisheries policy and management system give priority to economic values 
[51, 52, 53, 54, and 55]. As a result, fishing enterprises are no longer regarded as 
producers of many products, like fish, labour and social benefits, but mainly as 
producers of added economic value. The informal pay offs are reduced as a result, 
because the professionalized network formalizes as many practices and relationships 
as possible. These enterprises must therefore act as economically rational actors. As 
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a result, there are strong pressures to increase efficiency and this tends to be 
accomplished through increased capture capacity.   
 
8. Capture capacity is increased by policy and management, not reduced 
 Norway’s fisheries are enhancing capacity instead of reducing it despite huge 
investments in attempts to control separate elements, like the number of people, 
vessels, hold capacity and engine size. As long as the government and industry 
ideology and the official framework for analysis [5 and 51] give such a prominent 
position to financial “mechanisms” , there will be a constant drive towards greater 
capitalisation in the fisheries [1, 2, 15, and 16]. When the focus is on profitability and  
so long as it is possible to replace people with more effective machines, better gear, 
boats and equipment that allow the processes to go faster and faster thereby 
increasing the  economic value of the catch, the vacuum created by those people that 
leave will be filled  by enhanced technological capture capacity.  
With the policy focus on technical measures, the contribution of policy to the 
creation of the tightly interwoven enterprises has remained invisible. The increasing 
speed in fishing processes has also been missed. Many strong interests and forces are 
pulling in the same direction, towards creating more and more capture capacity.   
As in other North Atlantic states, pressures to modernize and increase 
technical and economic efficiency have become increasingly important in Norwegian 
fisheries policy [15, 16, 30, 31, 40, 51, and 57]. Within contemporary resource 
management in Norway, the fish has become a limited right, an option, an 
opportunity, and a requirement that does not give the actors the choice, whether they 
want it or not, to remain “fishers”. The fish must be fished. If not, the fisher loses 
both his position in the network and the status of an actor in the fishing regime. The 
fish must also be fished in increasingly efficient ways, with as little human effort as 
possible and with as much added value as possible if the enterprise is to survive. The 
management model defines not only the relation between the fish and the individual,  
but also the appropriate actions that are required to be defined as also the actors; i.e. 
the fishers  [15, 18, 31, and 41]. Even if the owners and skippers are still able to 
make choices and decisions, the network they are a part of structures the 
opportunities for choice and decision-making constraining their options.  
Seen from this perspective, changes in the harvest machinery and capture 
capacity expansion are not the result of people’s “soft choices”, but products instead 
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of rather hard forces and strong and complex processes where policy, science, 
technological development, market economy, human relations, personal interests, 
skills and abilities act together. The machinery’s existence is partly a result of more 
than 50 years of fisheries policy in the Northern Atlantic where the accepted path to 
economic efficiency has been concentration, technical modernisation, and capital 
investment on behalf of employment and decentralisation [15, 16, 56 and 57]. The 
realisation of these goals can be found in the integrated harvest machinery of today, 
humans, politics, economy and technology are tightly linked together, and capture 
capacity is continuously expanded [15].  
By studying the actions through which the integrated machinery has come 
into existence we can see the many relations and actions that have contributed to this 
increase in capture capacity. From this perspective, it becomes clear that a reduction 
in the number of people and number of vessels involved in fishing will not 
necessarily reduce the problem of overcapacity in fisheries or ensure the 
development of sustainable fisheries. One reason for this is that we are not talking 
about single entities like engines, nets and boats but rather about a whole complex of 
relations. As long as fisheries policy and management overlook the fact that 
expanding capture capacity is an effect of a network of relations rather than a product 
of the individual actions of rational economic actors, capacity will continue to 
increase. The first step towards changing this is to acknowledge this relational effect.  
How to control it, however, is quite another matter. 
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Table 3. Wage payment ability, results of financial items, and long-term liabilities in 
the year-round Norwegian fishing fleet 1995–2001. Source: [7-12] [15] 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Wage payment ability (1000 
NOK) 
2144 2522 2898 3450 2860 2365 2232
Results of financial items (net 
financial costs in 1000 NOK) 
195 249 261 315 484 555 596
Long-term liabilities (1000 NOK) 4173 4601 5003 6020 7158 9646 11175
 
 
 
 
 
